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OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
This appeal requires us to determine whether the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (“CDA”), Pub. L. No. 111350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3816-26 (2011) (to be codified at 41
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109), 1 bars breach of contract and
“essentially contractual” claims against the United States
Postal Service (“USPS”) in the district courts of the United
States. We find that it does, and will affirm.

1

On January 4, 2011, subsequent to the completion of
briefing in this appeal, Congress altered the provisions of the
CDA in ways immaterial to our analysis. The session laws
reflecting the alterations also note that the CDA will be
recodified. See Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3,
124 Stat. 3677, 3816-26. Accordingly, the provisions of the
CDA formerly listed in the U.S. Code at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601613 will be listed at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109. We cite to the
session laws and note the expected codification section of the
U.S. Code because recodification was not finalized at the time
of this Opinion.
2

I.
The factual background of this case is not complicated
and is largely undisputed.
Anselma Crossing, L.P.
(“Anselma”), is the owner and developer of a piece of real
estate in Chester Springs, Pennsylvania. In November 2009,
Anselma filed a complaint against the USPS—amended in
February 2010—alleging that Anselma and the USPS agreed
in March 2007 that the USPS would lease a post office
building from Anselma which Anselma would construct at its
site in or around 2010. The agreement was not reduced to
writing. Anselma alleged that the USPS made representations
to the local government that Anselma had been chosen as a
new USPS site. In reliance on the agreement and the USPS’s
representations, Anselma claims to have spent substantial
sums on engineering, professional, and environmental
services directly related to constructing a building that would
meet USPS requirements. At some point in late 2008, the
USPS made an internal decision to rescind all formerly
approved new projects, a decision which affected 400
projects, including the Anselma project. Anselma was
informed of the USPS’s decision when the USPS replied to
inquiries from Anselma’s Congressman in March 2009.
Anselma sought $150,000 in damages under theories of
breach of contract and promissory estoppel.
The USPS moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). The District Court heard oral argument
and granted the USPS’s motion, reaffirming its decision in
Spodek v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753 (E.D. Pa.
1998), where, in a case similar to the one before us, it found
that the CDA barred jurisdiction in the federal district courts
over breach of contract claims against the USPS. This timely
appeal followed. 2
On an appeal from a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,
2

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1291.
3

we exercise plenary review over legal conclusions and review
a district court’s findings of fact for clear error. CNA v.
United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008).
II.
The question of whether a district court has jurisdiction
to entertain a breach of contract claim against the USPS is
simply stated but not so simply resolved. Indeed, to answer
the question we must examine the interplay between the CDA
and various provisions of the Postal Reorganization Act
(“PRA”), 39 U.S.C. §§ 401, 409, 410, as well as the issue of
sovereign immunity.
It is well settled that “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign
immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies
from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The
United States must consent to be sued, and “the existence of
consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). The USPS is an
“independent establishment” of the executive branch and,
thus, is part of the government and cannot be sued absent a
waiver. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540
U.S. 736, 744 (2004) (citing 39 U.S.C. § 201). The
government has waived the immunity of the USPS through
the PRA, which gives the USPS the power to “sue and be
sued in its official name.” 39 U.S.C § 401(1); see also
Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. at 741. Relevant to this appeal, §
409(a) of the PRA states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided
in this title, the United States district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or
against the Postal Service.” 39 U.S.C. § 409(a).
The question before us, then, is not whether an
aggrieved party may bring a claim against the USPS—it
can—but where the claim may be brought. With respect to
claims sounding in contract, the CDA “established a
comprehensive framework for resolving contract disputes
between executive branch agencies and government
contractors.” Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 614
F.3d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The CDA applies to any
4

express or implied contract entered into by an executive
agency for the procurement of property, services,
construction, repair, or the disposal of personal property.
Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)). Under the CDA, a claim for
breach of contract must be presented to a designated
contracting officer. A party may appeal a decision by the
contracting officer to the relevant board of contract appeals or
to the United States Court of Federal Claims. Id. at § 3, 124
Stat. at 3817-22 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103-7105). 3
“The CDA is intended to keep government contract disputes
out of district courts; it limits review of the merits of
government contract disputes to certain forums, both to limit
the waiver of sovereign immunity and to submit government
contract issues to forums that have specialized knowledge and
experience.” United States v. Kasler Elec. Co., 123 F.3d 341,
346 (6th Cir. 1997); see also S. Rep. No. 95-1118, at 1
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235 (noting
that the purpose of the CDA is to “help to induce resolution of
more contract disputes by negotiation prior to litigation;
equalize the bargaining power of the parties when a dispute
exists; provide alternate forums suitable to handle different
types of disputes; and insure fair and equitable treatment to
contractors and Government agencies”).
A.
Anselma argues that the plain language of § 401(1) of
the PRA allows the USPS to “sue and be sued,” that federal
district courts have original but not exclusive jurisdiction to
hear claims against the USPS under § 409(a) of the PRA, and
that the CDA does not bar breach of contract claims in the
federal district courts. Anselma relies on our decision in
Licata v. U.S. Postal Service, 33 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 1994),
which raised but left open the precise question in this appeal.
3

The CDA “established” a board of contract appeals
within the USPS called the Postal Service Board of Contract
Appeals. Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3822
(2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1)).
5

In Licata, the plaintiff sued the USPS for breach of
contract. Two issues were raised: (1) whether § 409(a)
provided an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction;
and (2) whether the Tucker Act deprived the district courts of
jurisdiction over the USPS. Only the first issue is relevant
here. As to that issue, we disagreed with the line of cases
holding that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under §
409(a) without a separate valid cause of action. Id. at 262
(“[W]e believe that the Postal Service’s argument . . . that
subject matter jurisdiction is absent without a cause of action
is seriously flawed because whether or not a cause of action
exists goes to the merits, not to the question of subject-matter
jurisdiction.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Instead, we held that § 409(a) had a plain meaning that gave a
“clear and unequivocal grant of jurisdiction to the district
courts.” Id. at 261 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, we held that “absent some other
statutory bar, section 409(a) grants district courts subject
matter jurisdiction over actions to which the Postal Service is
a party.” Id. at 263. Importantly, we also clarified that §
401(1), the PRA’s “sue and be sued” clause, addresses the
USPS’s waiver of sovereign immunity, while § 409(a)
addresses subject matter jurisdiction, and that it was error to
conflate the two provisions when considering whether the
district court had jurisdiction over cases involving the USPS.
Id. at 262. Sua sponte, we raised, but left open, the possibility
that the CDA was a statutory bar to § 409(a)’s grant of
jurisdiction, id. at 254 n.6, the question we answer today. 4
The USPS urges us to follow U.S. Postal Service v.
Flamingo Industries (USA), Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004),
4

Following Licata, district courts within the Third
Circuit have not been consistent as to whether the CDA bars
federal district court jurisdiction over contract claims against
the USPS. Compare Eagle Fence Co., v. V.S. Electric, Inc.,
324 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (dismissing claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), and Spodek, 26 F.
Supp. 2d at 755 (same), with Pike v. U.S. Postal Serv., 886 F.
Supp. 487, 490-91 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that district court
had jurisdiction).
6

decided ten years after Licata. In Flamingo Industries, the
Court addressed the question of how to determine when the
“sue and be sued” clause of 39 U.S.C. § 401(1) permits suits
against the USPS. Plaintiffs there sued the USPS under
federal antitrust law. The Court described a two-step process
for determining whether the USPS could be subject to
substantive liability. First, “[w]e ask . . . whether there is a
waiver of sovereign immunity for actions against the Postal
Service. If there is, we ask the second question, which is
whether the substantive prohibitions of the Sherman Act
apply to an independent establishment of the Executive
Branch of the United States.” Id. at 743. In explaining why
the second step was “important,” the Court stated that “[a]n
absence of immunity does not result in liability if the
substantive law in question is not intended to reach the federal
entity. So we proceed to [the] second step to determine if the
substantive antitrust liability defined by the statute extends to
the Postal Service.” Id. at 744. Applying its two-step
process, the Court determined that under the first step, §
401(1) waived immunity.
Under the second step, it
determined that because neither the government nor the USPS
was a “person” under the Sherman Act, the USPS “is not
controlled by the antitrust laws.” Id. at 748. 5
Flamingo Industries is not, however, directly
applicable to the question before us, i.e. whether the CDA is a
statutory bar to § 409(a)’s grant of jurisdiction to the federal
district courts. Flamingo Industries only discussed the waiver
of sovereign immunity under § 401(1), which addresses
whether the USPS can be sued; it did not discuss § 409(a),
which addresses where the USPS can be sued once sovereign
immunity has been waived. 6 See, e.g., Cont’l Cablevision of
5

Flamingo Industries did not establish new law; the
two-part test had been established in FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 484 (1994).
6
Even if we applied Flamingo Industries, we would
conclude that Anselma satisfies the two-part test. Under the
first part, there is no question that the “sue and be sued”
clause of § 401(1) waives sovereign immunity. Under the
second part, we look to the substantive claim to see whether
7

St. Paul, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 945 F.2d 1434, 1437 (8th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that § 409(a) is a grant of jurisdiction,
while § 401(1) is a waiver of sovereign immunity). Licata set
forth the law of this circuit regarding § 401(1)’s relevance—
or, more appropriately, irrelevance—to a § 409(a) analysis of
subject matter jurisdiction, and the subsequently decided
Flamingo Industries does not require a reevaluation of Licata.
B.
At issue, then, is the question that Licata left open—
whether the CDA is a statutory bar to the jurisdiction granted
to the federal district courts in § 409(a). Although we find,
for the reasons stated below, that it is, we must first explain
why the CDA continues to apply to the USPS following the
2006 amendments to the statute.
i.
Under the heading, “Applicability of [C]hapter,” the
CDA states
(a)
EXECUTIVE
AGENCY
CONTRACTS.—Unless
otherwise
specifically provided in this chapter, this
chapter applies to any express or implied
contract (including those of the
nonappropriated fund activities described
Congress intended it to apply to the government agency. In
Flamingo Industries, the Court held that the USPS was not a
“person” and therefore not controlled by the antitrust laws.
Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. at 744-48. Here, however,
Anselma alleges breach of contract, and the CDA allows
contract claims to proceed against the government and the
USPS—it simply specifies where the claim must proceed.
See, e.g., Pinckney v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 490, 505
(Fed. Cl. 2009) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims .
. . has jurisdiction to ‘render judgment upon any claim against
the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied
contract with the United States.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a)(1))).
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in sections 1346 and 1491 of title 28)
made by an executive agency for—
(1) the procurement of property, other
than real property in being;
(2) the procurement of services;
(3) the procurement of construction,
alteration, repair, or maintenance of real
property; or
(4) the disposal of personal property.
Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)) (emphasis added).
Until 2006, and since the Act’s enactment in 1978, 41
U.S.C. § 601, the former definitional section of the CDA,
defined the term “executive agency” as
an executive department as defined in
section 101 of Title 5, an independent
establishment as defined by section 104
of Title 5 (except that it shall not include
the Government Accountability Office),
a military department as defined by
section 102 of Title 5, and a wholly
owned Government corporation as
defined by section 9101(3) of Title 31,
the United States Postal Service, and the
Postal Rate Commission
41 U.S.C. § 601(2) (2004), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 601(2)
(2006) (emphasis added). In 2006, however, Congress
amended the CDA to strike out the phrase, “the United States
Postal Service, and the Postal Rate Commission.” See 41
U.S.C. § 601(2) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-350, §
3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. §
7101(8)). The recently recodified statute retains the 2006
amendment, defining an “executive agency” as
9

(A) an executive department as defined in
section 101 of title 5;
(B) a military department as defined in
section 102 of title 5;
(C) an independent establishment as
defined in section 104 of title 5, except
that the term does not include the
Government Accountability Office; and
(D) a wholly owned Government
corporation as defined in section 9101(3)
of title 31.
Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7101(8)).
None of the definitions of “executive agency” includes
the USPS, a point the USPS concedes. The USPS argues,
however, that the CDA continues to apply to the USPS
because (1) the 2006 amendments to the CDA reauthorized
the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals, and thus the
statute continued to treat the USPS as an executive agency
(and the 2011 recodification continues that reauthorization); 7
7

Added as part of the 2006 amendments, § 607(c)
established an agency board of contract appeals
to be known as the “Postal Service Board of
Contract Appeals”. Such board shall have
jurisdiction to decide any appeal from a decision
of a contracting officer of the United States
Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory
Commission relative to a contract made by
either agency. . . . This chapter shall apply to
contract disputes before the Postal Service
Board of Contract Appeals in the same manner
as they apply to contract disputes before the
Civilian Board.
10

and (2) there is no evidence in the legislative history that
Congress intended to remove the USPS from the CDA. 8
41 U.S.C. § 607(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3,
124 Stat. 3677, 3822 (2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. §
7105(d)-(e)).
8
The legislative history of the 2006 amendments is
silent on Congress’ rationale for striking the USPS from §
601(2). The 2006 amendments were included in a bill titled
“National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.”
The report on the Act from the House of Representatives
states, in relevant part, only that the Act
would provide conforming amendments to
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (Disputes
Act) (41 U.S.C. 601) needed by the
establishment of the Defense Board of
Contract Appeals and the Civilian Board of
Contract Appeals (Civilian Board) regarding
contract disputes. This section also would
establish the Postal Service Board of
Contract Appeals to decide appeals under
the Disputes Act for contracts awarded by
the United States Postal Service or the
Postal Rate Commission and provide for the
selection and appointment of Board judges
by the Postmaster General in the same
manner as judges of the Civilian Board.
H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, at 397 (2005) (emphasis added).
This section explains the “establish[ment]” of the
Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals, but nowhere is
there an explanation of why § 601(2) removed all reference to
the USPS. Congress’ silence, in the presence of contrary
additions to the 2006 statute, weighs against a finding that
Congress intended a wholesale removal of the USPS from the
CDA. See NLRB v. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79,
Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, 404
U.S. 116, 129-30 (1971) (noting that the Supreme Court “has
frequently cautioned that ‘(i)t is at best treacherous to find in
11

Unfortunately for the USPS, by removing it from the
definition of “executive agency” while at the same time
adding provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the Postal
Service Board of Contract Appeals, Congress created an
ambiguity about whether the Act applies to it at all.
We need not resolve this ambiguity, however, because
there is another, unambiguous reason for why the CDA
applies to the USPS. That reason is this: the PRA permits the
USPS to adopt the CDA via its own internal regulations, see
39 U.S.C. §410(a), and it has done so in 39 C.F.R. § 601.109.
Section 410(a) states that
Except as provided by subsection (b) of
this section, and except as otherwise
provided in this title or insofar as such
laws remain in force as rules or
regulations of the Postal Service, no
Federal law dealing with public or
Federal contracts, property, works,
officers, employees, budgets, or funds,
including the provisions of chapters 5
and 7 of title 5, shall apply to the
exercise of the powers of the Postal
Service.
39 U.S.C. § 410(a) (emphasis added). Stated more succinctly,
the CDA does not apply to the USPS unless the CDA
“remain[s] in force as rules or regulations of the Postal
Service.” Id. The USPS argues that Congress, by virtue of §
410(a), allowed it to decide whether or not to remain bound
by the CDA, and that it has decided to do so by administrative
regulation in 39 C.F.R. § 601.109. See 39 C.F.R. § 601.109
(“This section implements the Contract Disputes Act of 1978,
Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule
of law.’” (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69
(1946))).
12

as amended (41 U.S.C. 601-613).”). Although we agree with
the USPS that “[t]o argue that a federal agency, by regulation,
can effectively limit the jurisdiction of federal district courts
is counterintuitive,” see Appellee’s Letter Br. of December
20, 2010 at 7 n.5, a literal reading of the statute supports the
USPS’s right, via authorization by Congress, to adopt the
CDA in whole as part its own administrative regulations.
Accordingly, the CDA continues to apply to the USPS,
regardless of any ambiguity within the 2006 amendments and
2011 recodification.
ii.
We turn, finally, to the main issue in this case:
whether the CDA overrides the grant of jurisdiction to the
federal district courts in § 409(a). The USPS argues that §
409(a) “is a general grant of jurisdiction that is necessarily
limited by more specific grants of exclusive jurisdiction to
other courts or administrative bodies,” and that the CDA is
such a specific statute. Appellee’s Br. at 22. It cites to
opinions of the Supreme Court and this Court stating that
precisely written statutes prevail over more general statutes.
See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976)
(“In a variety of contexts the Court has held that a precisely
drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”);
D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)
(“Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or
another statute which otherwise might be controlling.”); In re
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 328 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“Statutory Construction 101 contains the canon that a
specific provision will prevail over a general one.”). “The
CDA,” the USPS concludes, “is a specific statute that applies
to procurement contracts and vests exclusive jurisdiction over
claims in the Court of Federal Claims or the agency board of
contract appeals.” In contrast, “[t]he jurisdictional grant in 39
U.S.C. § 409 applies to a wide, undifferentiated mass of
claims and is therefore plainly more general. Thus, the CDA
controls as to claims within its scope.” Appellee’s Br. at 2223.
The clear majority of courts of appeals that have
13

addressed whether the CDA bars federal district court
jurisdiction over breach of contract claims against the USPS
have found that it does. In Goodin v. U.S. Postal Inspection
Serv., 444 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2006), for example, the plaintiff
brought breach of contract claims and the district court
dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
the CDA. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court
had jurisdiction based on the sue and be sued clause of §
401(1). Id. at 1000. The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument
because (1) “a ‘precisely drawn, detailed statute [—the
CDA—] preempts more general remedies,’” id. at 1001
(quoting Brown, 425 U.S. at 834); and (2) the CDA contains a
provision (41 U.S.C. § 602(b), to be recodified at 41 U.S.C. §
7102(b)) that exempts disputes over certain specific contracts
formed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (whose contract
contains a sue and be sued clause). “[I]f Congress had
intended sue and be sued clauses to enable parties to escape
the exclusive jurisdiction provided by the CDA and sue in
federal district court, it would not have needed to specify in
41 U.S.C. § 602(b) that disputes over some contracts formed
by the Tennessee Valley Authority . . . are exempted from the
CDA.” Id.; see also Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank,
137 F.3d 885, 890-92 (6th Cir. 1998) (sue and be sued clause
in SBA legislation did not provide district court jurisdiction
for contract claim); A&S Council Oil Co., v. Lader, 56 F.3d
234, 241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. J&E
Salvage Co., 55 F.3d 985, 988 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding
contract actions against USPS barred from district court
without mention of PRA provisions); Jackson v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 799 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating without
analysis that the enactment of the CDA in 1978 removed
concurrent jurisdiction over suits against the USPS from the
federal district courts); but see In re Liberty Constr., 9 F.3d
800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1993) (SBA’s sue and be sued clause
provided an independent statutory grant of jurisdiction in
federal district court); Wright v. U.S. Postal Serv., 29 F.3d
1426, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying reasoning of Liberty
Construction to USPS based on 39 U.S.C. § 401(1)); Marine
Coatings of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 932 F.2d 1370, 1377
(11th Cir. 1991) (contract claim against the government could
proceed in district court, but only because of jurisdiction
14

through the Maritime Lien Act).
The opinions cited above generally analyzed the
relationship of the CDA to § 401(1) without any analysis of §
409(a), much less any analysis of whether § 409(a) provided a
jurisdictional grant separate from § 401(1). Licata, on the
other hand, instructs that § 409(a) is the section of the PRA
addressing subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district
courts, and § 401(1) addresses only the USPS’s waiver of
sovereign immunity, Licata, 33 F.3d at 262. Accordingly, our
concern is with § 409(a), and the cases cited above are not
directly on point.
That said, we are persuaded by the reasoning of those
cases which conclude that the CDA bars district court
jurisdiction, despite the jurisdictional grant in § 409(a). The
CDA was enacted in 1978, later in time than the PRA, which
was enacted in 1970. The provisions of the CDA governing
jurisdiction are both more recently and more precisely drawn
than the terms of the PRA, compare Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3,
124 Stat. 3677, 3817-20 (2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C.
§§ 7103-7104), with 39 U.S.C. § 409(a), and “a specific
provision will prevail over a general one.” In re Phila.
Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 328. Further, the CDA specifically
lists several types of contracts that are excluded from its
coverage, and “nowhere does the statute exclude contracts
with the USPS from coverage.” See Prefab Prods., Inc. v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 600 F. Supp. 89, 91-92 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(citing, as examples of excluded contracts, the former 41
U.S.C. §§ 602(b) (to be recodified at § 7102(b)) (certain
Tennessee Valley Authority contracts), 602(c) (to be
recodified at § 7102(c)) (certain contracts with foreign
governments), and 603 (to be recodified at § 7102(d)) (certain
maritime contracts)). Finally, and importantly, a ruling that
would permit contract claims against the USPS to be heard in
the federal district courts and thereafter in the twelve courts of
appeals would undermine the policy goals of the CDA—to
collect contract disputes against the government in a forum,
be it the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals or in the
Court of Claims, with both the requisite expertise and the
ability to provide consistency in applying the laws related to
15

government contracts.
We conclude that because the CDA is a statutory bar to
jurisdiction over breach of contract claims against the USPS
in the federal district courts, the District Court properly
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
III.
The order of the District Court will be affirmed.
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